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Abstract. Estimating the value of top managerial talent is a central topic of research that has 
attracted widespread attention from academics and practitioners. Yet, studying the impact of 
managers on firm performance is difficult because of endogeneity and omitted variables 
concerns. We test for the impact of managers on firm performance in two ways. First, we 
examine whether top management (chief executive officers and board members) deaths have an 
impact on firm performance, focusing on the manager and firm characteristics that are associated 
to large manager-death effects. To our knowledge, this is the first test that assesses the 
consequences of managerial deaths on firm operating performance, investment rates and sales 
growth. Second, to bolster the interpretation that these effects are driven by managers, we test 
whether the death of top management’ immediate family members (spouse, parents, children, 
etc) affect firm prospects. These events provide us with exogenous variation in the attention 
managers pay to their business and thus allow us to measure the impact of managerial 
contribution to firm prospects. Our main findings are three. First, CEO deaths are strongly 
correlated with declines in firm operating profitability, asset growth and sales growth. Second, 
the death of board members does not seem to affect firm prospects, indicating that not all senior 
managers are equally important for firms’ outcomes. Third, CEOs’ immediate family deaths are 
significantly negatively correlated to firm performance. This last result establishes a strong link 
between the personal and business roles that top management play. Overall, our findings 
demonstrate CEOs are extremely important for firms’ prospects. 
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What do managers do? Do managers meaningfully affect firm decision-making and 
performance? What types of managers or managerial decisions do matter for firms’ prospects? 
What types of shocks affect managers’ productive abilities? Estimating the source and value of 
top managerial talent is a central topic of research in corporate governance. Yet empirical studies 
testing for the value of managers on performance have typically faced the challenge of finding a 
suitable counterfactual to convincingly assess the contribution of managers in their organizations. 
This challenge arises from the fact that firms do not randomly appoint nor fire managers. Thus it 
is hard to evaluate performance in the absence of the current, presumably efficient, managers.  
Studies typically infer the value of managers from either purely cross-sectional studies or 
from manager turnover events. The former type of studies face the challenge of distinguishing 
managerial effects from other firm attributes, as it is hard to find suitable controls for all relevant 
firm and managerial characteristics. The latter empirical strategies, in contrast, tend to be better at 
distinguishing managerial from firm-invariant attributes as they commonly infer managerial value 
from differences in firm performance around turnover events. Yet, executive turnover tend to 
occur only under dramatic circumstances, resulting from both managers’ discretion and 
challenging firm circumstances, which are typically difficult to disentangle. 
In this paper we seek to overcome some of these shortcomings by evaluating the impact 
of managers on performance using variation from managers’ own deaths and other personal 
shocks. Specifically we test whether the death of managers (chief executive officers (CEOs) or 
board members) or the death of their immediate family members (spouses, parents, children, etc) 
affects firm operating performance. The advantages of this horrid empirical strategy are two. 
First, these shocks presumably affect managers’ ability to perform their jobs: directly through 
their own death or indirectly, by examining the consequences of personal grief on their ability to 
execute their professional roles. Second, it is reasonable to expect that beyond its effect on 
managers, personal shocks, particularly those associated to family members that are unaffiliated 
to the managers’ firm, do not affect firms’ investment opportunities through other channels.  
The first test focusing on the deaths of top executive officers resembles the empirical 
strategy of Johnson, et al (1985), who assessed the impact of sudden deaths of senior corporate 
executives on the stock prices of 53 U.S. publicly-traded firms. We extend the manager-death 
analysis to the performance evaluation of a larger number and wider range of firms. Further, we 
also assess the impact of a richer array of executive and firm characteristics that could affect the 
role of managers on firm performance.  
Our second set of tests emphasizing the shocks occurring to managers’ immediate family 
members is inspired by the insights of Becker’s (1965) seminal work on the allocation of time 
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between productive and household activities. We hypothesize family deaths would tend to 
increase the time managers spend with their families and, in consequence, reduce the time spent 
at the firm. An attractive feature of this test on the value of managerial talent is that it based on 
existing management teams, relative to the first empirical strategy that focuses on the relative 
performance of existing and succeeding managers. Using these family shocks we investigate the 
level of overlap between the business and personal spheres under management influence, and 
assess the differential impact of alternative shocks occurring to business executives. Our focus on 
the shocks occurring to managers’ immediate family members and their potential consequences 
on firms’ outcomes is, to the best of our knowledge, new in the CEO turnover literature.  
To pursue these questions empirically, we use a detailed dataset that includes financial 
and senior management information on every limited liability firm in Denmark between 1992 and 
2003. These data are unique in that we are able to match each chief executive officer (CEO) and 
board member to Civil Registry data containing information on their spouse (if any), children, 
parents and parents-in-law. Based on this information we then construct manager-level family 
trees and we then investigate which managers or immediate family members die during the 
sample period. In our empirical test, we use the first shock occurring to the senior management –
direct or indirect– of the firms in the sample, allowing only one shock per firm. 
We are able to identify 11,002 deaths occurring to executives and board members and to 
their immediate family members between 1994 and 2002. In the sample, 1,476 deaths 
corresponded to CEOs (629 cases) and board members (847), 1,483 to spouses, 5,046 to parents, 
2,561 to parents-in-law and 415 to children.  
We begin our analysis by testing for direct senior management (CEO and board 
members) effects. We find evidence that the death of senior corporate executives is likely to 
cause a statistically significantly and economically large decline in firm profitability. Operating 
returns on assets (OROA) fall by 0.6 percentage points using a two-year window around 
managerial deaths. This decline is equivalent to a 9.6 percent decline in profitability. 
Interestingly, the significant effect in performance is only explained by the deaths of CEOs, 
which are associated with a decline in OROA of 1.4 percentage points or 18 percent, significant 
at the one-percent level. The effect of board members in performance is negative but insignificant 
at conventional levels. These results indicate that the loss of the current CEOs, but not of an 
existing board member, significantly affects firm’s prospects. 
 
We then assess the impact of family shocks on firm performance. We find that deaths of 
immediate family members of managers also cause significant declines in operating performance. 
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OROA falls by 0.8 percent, 0.7 percent, 0.6 percent, and 0.4 percent when the deceased is a 
spouse, a child, a parent, and a parent in law, respectively. The declines associated with deaths of 
spouses, children and parents are statistically significant at the five-percent level. Paralleling the 
results obtained with own death shocks, we find that family members’ deaths are associated with 
statistically significant declines in performance only when these shocks occur to CEOs but not 
when they occur to board members. 
Given that our dataset is representative of the universe of limited liability firms in 
Denmark, one concern with the above-described results is that they might only be relevant for 
small firms, which tend to be more dependant on their CEOs and where the level of overlap 
between personal and business affairs is likely to be higher than in larger ventures. We find, 
however, that this is not the case. Both small and large firms’ operating profitability is 
significantly hurt by shocks affecting their CEOs. 
We test further whether our family death shocks are likely to reflect “direct” or “indirect” 
shocks. One concern with the family shock results is that the deaths of family members might 
affect firm performance directly because the deceased relative was a key firm employee. Our 
findings are not consistent with that hypothesis. Specifically, the death of family members that 
are not of working age (younger than 18) have an economically and statistically large negative 
effect on firm profitability, that is statistically indistinguishable from the declines in performance 
that result from the deaths of other family members. This finding highlights that the family-death 
results are driven by an indirect shock that works through the firms’ CEO.  
We provide suggestive evidence that the decline in performance around direct and 
indirect shocks is related to managerial ability. Specifically, we find that the decline in 
performance following a shock to a CEO is larger in industries in which managerial talent is 
presumably more important, such as, fast growing industries, as well as, in environments with 
highly educated labor force. 
Overall, manager-death shocks provide direct evidence that CEOs (but not board 
members) are extremely important for firm performance. Family-death results demonstrate there 
is a strong overlap between the personal lives and the professional roles that CEOs play, and they 
provide further evidence that current CEOs are extremely important for firms’ prospects.  
While we cannot provide a direct test for whether our results reveal that CEOs add 
economic value in an ex-ante sense, we do show that the CEOs’ permanent or temporary absence 
is material for firm ex-post performance.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews previous work in the 
literature that is closely related to our own analysis. Section II describes the data and presents 
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summary statistics. Section III outlines our empirical strategy; Section IV presents the results of 
the paper; and Section V concludes. 
 
I. Related Literature  
 
This paper is directly related to several lines of research. Given that our main objective is 
to investigate the impact of top management on firm performance we build on existing top 
management turnover studies evaluating the role of managers on firms’ prospects. Our empirical 
strategy is heavily influenced by the interaction between business and personal decisions, which 
relates to both established studies in labor economics, as well as, to the growing family firms 
literature. Our focus on detailed manager characteristics also relates to recent studies showing 
managerial individual characteristics have a bearing on firms’ decision-making. 
 
I. A. Management Turnover and Firm Performance 
 
Our paper relates to studies evaluating the impact of CEO turnover on firm performance 
using event-study methodologies focusing on (a) stock price responses to management turnover 
announcement decisions and (b) changes in firm operating results around these events. 
A large number of studies have examined the announcement effects of managerial 
turnover decisions with mixed results. While Reinganum (1985) and Warner et al (1988) failed to 
find significant abnormal returns resulting from managerial turnover, Weisbach (1988) and 
Bonnier and Bruner (1989) documented significantly positive stock price reactions to turnover 
decisions. Yet, Khanna and Poulsen (1995) find negative average effects. Denis and Denis (1995) 
find significantly positive but economically small effects for forced turnover and insignificant 
results for normal retirements.  
Market-based tests on the role of management are attractive in that one could potentially 
estimate the value of changing executives conditional on all relevant information. Its drawbacks 
are, however, several. First, the identity of a large share of succeeding managers –those that are 
internal–tends to be anticipated. Second, turnover decisions often coincide with other relevant 
news about firms. Third, the decision to replace a management team by itself can provide 
information about the firms’ prospects. Given the strong evidence that the likelihood of 
management turnover is negatively related to performance (Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), 
Warner et al (1988), Weisbach (1988), Dahya, et al (2002), Fee and Hadlock (2004)) it might be 
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strong to assume that management turnover decisions are the only valuable source of information 
provided to investors at the time of announcement. 
An attractive test for the impact of managerial talent using stock prices is Johnson, et al. 
(1985) sudden senior management death analysis. Relative to average turnover events, an 
advantage of Johnson, et al. (1985) analysis is that it is hard to argue sudden management deaths 
coincide with other events that are not directly linked to the dying individuals. Using data from 
53 U.S. publicly traded firms they find (1) no average effects, (2) a negative (positive) abnormal 
return for non-founder (founder) CEOs, (3) larger declines for those firms whose deceased senior 
executives were relatively more important in their firms in terms of compensation and had shown 
strong pre-death firm performance (sales growth, ROE and stock price performance). These 
results have been interpreted as indicative that founder-CEOs destroy while professional and high 
performing managers enhance value. Yet as Slovin and Sushka (1993) have shown, some of these 
relative results might be alternatively explained not by managerial talent per se but by changes in 
the probability of a corporate control contest. Specifically, founder deaths might trigger firm sales 
that would not occur under alternative organizational structures. Whether managerial deaths 
affect firms operating performance is thus far unexplored. 
An alternative route to test for the value of managers is to assess their impact on 
managerial turnover decisions on firms’ operating profitability. Denis and Denis (1995) evaluate 
changes in operating return on assets around forced resignations and retirements in a sample of 
large U.S. publicly traded firms during the late eighties. They find significant firm performance 
improvements after CEO transitions, especially for forced resignations, indicating new 
management teams improve firms’ prospects. Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) also find 
improvements in accounting profitability after managerial turnover events using a larger sample 
period. They find that the improved operating performance is not driven by mean-reversion in 
accounting variables, which is again consistent with added value by new management teams. 
More recently and in the context of relatively smaller firms, Pérez-González (2006) and 
Bennedsen et al (2007) find professional (non-family) CEOs are extremely important for firm 
performance around CEO transitions.  
One limitation of these latter studies is that they show management does improve firm 
performance after turnover events, yet a disproportionate share of turnover events occur under 
dramatic circumstances. In other words, it is hard to establish management teams significantly 
affect firm performance on average.  
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I. B. Family and Business Overlap and Family Firms 
 
Starting with the seminal work of Becker (1965, 1981), labor economists have long 
recognized that individuals’ market and non-market activities are closely interrelated (see for 
example, Gronau (1986)). Specifically, individuals’ allocate time and other decisions to maximize 
both professional and personal objectives, subject to their endowments.  
In the corporate finance literature, the importance of the interaction between family and 
professional decision-making is arguably greatest in “family” firms. Recent interest in this area of 
research was detonated by the finding that most firms around the world are owned, managed or 
controlled by families that are often related to the founder of the corporation (La Porta, et al. 
(1999).) Even in the United States, families are influential in the management of a large fraction 
of publicly traded firms (Anderson and Reeb (2003), Pérez-González (2006), Villalonga and 
Raphael Amit (2006).) Yet, we have little systematic evidence about the specific channels 
through which family and business spheres interact. 
CEO succession decisions are a prominent exception. Competitive contests would rarely 
yield a family descendant as a new CEO. Yet evidence by Pérez-González (2006) and Bennedsen 
et al (2007) shows family successions are common in the United States and in Denmark, 
respectively. Consistent with the notion that a large number of these new family CEOs are chosen 
based on family and not competence considerations (evidence of overlapping spheres), they find 
family-CEOs significantly hurt firm performance, on average. Using detailed firm and family 
data from Denmark, Bennedsen et al (2007) go farther and demonstrates family characteristics 
(number of children, gender, etc) affect both the decision to name a family or unrelated CEO, as 
well as, who within the family (children, spouse, etc) gets the CEO position. Similarly, Bertrand, 
et al. (2006) show founders’ family characteristics affect the decision to name firm executives 
and directors in Thailand.  
The evidence that family considerations affect firms decision-making and that 
professional non-family CEOs have a positive effect on firm performance, it is however, hard to 
generalize beyond this sub-samples of family firms. 
 
I. C. Managerial Individual Characteristics and Firm Decision-Making 
 
Beyond family firms, our works also relates to recent papers linking detailed manager 
individual characteristics to firm decision-making. Using data from executives that switch 
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managerial positions, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show firm decisions can be attributed to 
managerial fixed effects. Similarly, Malmendier and Tate (2005) argue CEO overconfidence and 
other personal characteristics can affect firm investment decisions. 
In sum, we seek to contribute to preceding work in the literature in several ways. First, 
we provide a comprehensive test on whether, beyond their effect on stock prices, senior 
management deaths affect firm operating profitability. Given that senior management deaths do 
not necessarily coincide with poor firm prospects as most CEO turnover events, our evidence 
could potentially shed light on the value of managers, on average, and not only in troubled firms. 
Second, by focusing on the deaths of immediate family members, we provide a new and arguably 
more general test on the interaction between personal and business decision-making. An 
additional appeal of this latter test is that it is arguably a cleaner test for the effect of managers of 
performance as it is unlikely that the deaths of managers’ immediate family members is affected 
by firms’ performance. Third, the larger sample size would potentially allow us to identify those 
firm and individual characteristics that are likely to matter the most in evaluating the impact of 
managers on firm performance.  
 
II. Data Description and Summary Statistics 
 
II.A. Data  
 
We construct a dataset starting from the universe of limited liability (publicly and 
privately held) firms in Denmark (74,880 firms) and identify 11,002 firms in which the CEO, a 
board member, or any of these managers’ immediate relatives die between 1994 and 2002. Our 
dataset contains financial information on firms, as well as personal and family information about 
CEOs and board members. The dataset was constructed based on four different sources, as 
explained below. 
1. Financial and management information are from Købmandsstandens 
Oplysningsbureau (KOB). KOB is a dataset assembled by a private firm using the annual reports 
that all limited liability firms are required to file at the Danish Ministry of Economic and 
Business Affairs. The dataset contains selected accounting and management information on the 
universe of limited liability companies in Denmark. Local regulations only mandate disclosure of 
firms’ assets and measures of firm profitability, such as operating or net income. The disclosure 
of alternative firm-level attributes, such as sales or employment, is not required, although some 
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firms do selectively report them. Management data, which all firms are required to report, include 
the names and position of executives and board members. 
 
We obtained access to management information from 1994 to 2002, and financial data 
from 1991 to 2003. Even though a large fraction of KOB firms are privately held, KOB data are 
likely to be reliable, as Danish corporate law requires annual reports to be approved by external 
accountants. Given our focus on changes in firm performance around CEO transitions, for our 
analysis, we only require that reporting biases are consistent at the firm level. 
2. Individual and family data about CEOs and board members are from the official 
Danish Civil Registration System. These administrative records include the personal 
identification number (CPR), name, gender, and dates of birth and death of all Danish citizens. In 
addition, these records contain the names and CPR numbers of parents, siblings, and children, as 
well as the individual’s marital history (number of marriages, divorces, and widowhoods). We 
use these data to construct CEOs and board members’ family trees and to identify deaths in their 
families. 
3. To match the names of top management reported in KOB with their CPR numbers, 
which are needed to access their individual and family information in the Danish Civil 
Registration System, we use a database from the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency 
(Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, or ES), at the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. The 
ES dataset reports both the names and CPR numbers of management and board members of all 
limited liability corporations. Under Danish corporate law, firms are required to file with ES any 
change in CEO or board positions within two weeks of the actual date of occurrence. 
Firm by firm, we match the name of the chief executive officer and those of the firms’ 
board members reported in KOB with the management and directors names reported in the ES 
dataset. For all these matches, we use the CPR number from ES to obtain family information 
from the official Danish Civil Registration System. Despite the fact that women often drop their 
maiden names after marriage, we are able to match men and women equally well. We do it by 
using women’s family trees to reconstruct their maiden names, as well as other names they had in 
previous marriages.  
In the paper, we classify a firm as an event firm when three conditions are met. First, the 
records in the CRP agency indicate that the CEO (board members) or any of his (their) immediate 
relatives die during the managers’ tenure. Second, we require that matching financial information 
from KOB is available around CEO transitions and that firm employment, where available, was 
not zero. Third, in case of multiple shocks to a single firm, we retain only the first one. 
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II.B. Firm Characteristics 
 
Table I presents summary statistics of the firms in the sample both as a group (Column I) 
and classified by their event status. Information for non-event firms is listed in Column II and that 
for event firms is in Column III.  
Table I shows that event firms are larger than non-event firms. The first row in Table I 
shows the natural logarithm of total assets for the firms in the sample. Event firms are relatively 
larger. On average, event-firms had 2000 Danish Kroner (DKR) 67.2 million or US$8.3 million 
in assets. In contrast, non-event firms had, on average, DKR 27.2 million or US$3.4 million in 
assets.2 The difference in firm size is significant at the one-percent level.  As an alternative 
measure of size, we report the natural logarithm of sales in the fourth row. The figure for event 
firms is larger than that for non-event firms and the difference is significant at the one-percent 
level.  
Table I also shows that event firms are older. On average, firm age is almost 17 years for 
event firms, while it is only 10 years for non-event firms. Again, this difference is statistically 
significant at the one-percent level. 
There are two reasons why event firms are larger and older. First, larger and older firms 
are more likely to have a board of directors and, conditional on having one, they are more likely 
to have larger boards. These firms are more likely to have a shock because the pool of potential 
candidates who can die is larger. Second, in the data there is a positive correlation between firm 
age and the age of its managers. Older manager are more likely to have larger families and also 
more likely to have older family members, increasing the probability of having a death in the 
family. 
Given that regulations only mandate disclosure of firms’ assets and measures of 
profitability such as operating and net income, in Table I we scale operating and net income using 
the book value of assets in order to present comparable measures of firm performance. Operating 
return on assets (OROA) is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to 
the book value of assets. OROA is a natural measure of performance that has been previously 
used in the CEO turnover literature to assess if firms operations change around successions 
(Denis and Denis (1995), Huson, et al (2004), Pérez-González (2006), Bennedsen, et al (2007)). It 
compares a comprehensive proxy of firms’ cash flows (EBIT) to the total asset base used to 
                                                 
 
2 The average exchange rate in 2000 was equivalent to 8.08 Kroner per U.S. dollar (World 
Development Indicators). 
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generate them. Unlike net income-based measures, such as return on assets, it is unaffected by 
differences in the firms’ capital structure decisions. In contrast to return on equity or return on 
capital employed, it compares firm performance relative to total assets, rather than to a fraction of 
them. Average OROA is 6.0 percent for all firms in the sample. Splitting firms by event status, 
we find that event firms are, on average, more profitable than non-event firms: 7.7 and 5.7 
percent, respectively; the difference of 2.0 percentage points, significant at the one-percent level. 
In Table I we also present the ratio of net income to assets, calculated using after-tax 
profits relative to the book value of assets. The average net income to assets is 3.4 percent and, as 
before, event firms are more profitable than non-event firms. The difference is 0.9 percent, 
significant at the one-percent level.  
Table I also reports industry-adjusted measures of OROA. Industry controls are 
calculated using equally weighted averages of all active firms. For each industry, we require that 
at least 20 non-event firms exist in any given year. We favor four-digit industry (NACE, 
European industry classification system) controls, and move to two-digits if the 20-firm 
restriction is not satisfied with four- or three-digit groupings. Industry-adjusted OROA shows that 
the difference in profitability for event and non-event firms is not entirely driven by industry 
characteristics: the difference is 1.1 percentage points. The reason why event firms are more 
profitable could be that better firms survive longer. This longevity implies that managers in these 
firms are older and hence, as explained before, more likely to suffer a death in the family of the 
CEO or one of its board members. Finally, Table I shows that event firms have higher asset and 
sales growth. For both these measures the differences between event and non-event firms are 
significant at the one-percent level. Table I shows, in sum, that event firms are older, larger and 
more profitable than non-event firms. 
  
II.C. Event characteristics 
 
We classify shocks by the type of manager affected: CEOs (5,597 shocks) and board 
members (5,405 shocks). Given that boards of directors typically have many members, it might 
appear that the number of shocks to board members is too low relative to that for CEOs. There 
are two reasons, however, why this is not the case. First, many firms in Denmark have more than 
one CEO. Second, in Denmark, limited liability firms incorporated as ApS corporations can 
choose whether to have a board of directors and many choose this option (37.7 percent of our 
sample). 
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We also classify shocks by the type of relation between the manager and the deceased.  
We identify 1,476 shocks to managers themselves, 1,483 to their spouses, 415 to their children, 
5,067 to their parents, and 2,561 to their parents-in-law. In our sample 84% of the managers are 
male, which are more likely to die before their female spouses.3 Despite this fact, the number of 
shocks to managers is roughly the same as the number of shocks to spouses. This can be 
explained by the fact that we construct the sample by taking the first shock for each firm. This 
procedure, in effect, over samples male relative to female family members. The small number of 
child relative to managers’ deaths is due to their young age. Age can also be a factor that explains 
the large number of shocks to parents. 
 
III. Empirical Strategy and Predictions 
 
We use shocks to CEOs, board members and these managers’ family members to address 
a number of questions related to the role of managers in their organizations as explained below. 
First, we test whether managers materially affect firms’ prospects by evaluating the 
change in firm operating performance around their own death. This test seeks to measure the 
effect of the loss of the senior manager. If the manager’s absence is not important for her firm’s 
prospects, we should not observe any significant change in performance around the event. In 
contrast, if the manager’s presence is important, we should observe a significant change (positive 
or negative) in firm performance around her death. 
An alternative setting to study the effect of the absence of a manager is to evaluate 
changes in firm performance around resignations and firings. However, a problem with this 
strategy is that resignations and firings might be prompted by changes in unobservable firm 
characteristics whose effect we might erroneously attribute to the manager’s absence. For 
example, a statistically insignificant change in performance following a forced management 
turnover can be view as evidence that the new and old CEOs are of comparable ability. However, 
an alternative explanation is that, expecting investment opportunities to deteriorate, the board 
chose a higher ability manager. The effect of better management outweighed the more difficult 
circumstances the firm faced, resulting in virtually unchanged performance. Because the timing 
of deaths is likely to be exogenous relative to observed and unobserved firm characteristics, our 
empirical strategy does not have this problem. 
                                                 
 
3 Even though same-sex marriage is allowed in Denmark since 1989, only a small fraction of the CEOs in 
our sample have a spouse of the same sex. 
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Second, we analyze whether deaths of managers’ immediate relatives affect performance 
through their effect on the manager. We first evaluate whether deaths of managers’ family 
members have an impact on firm performance. Finding a significant change in performance, 
however, does not necessarily imply that the shock works through the manager. An alternative 
interpretation is that the deceased worked in the firm and his death implied the loss of a key 
employee. Even though we do not have complete information on all employees of firms, we can 
test this alternative hypothesis by assessing whether the effect is present for family members that 
are not of working age. If the change in performance is still significant for this group, it would 
suggest that the family member’s death impacts performance indirectly through its effect on the 
manager. 
Even if we are able to rule out the direct effect of the death of a manger’s family member 
on firm performance in favor of an indirect effect working through the manager, we would still 
not be able to attribute differences in performance changes around the event to managerial ability. 
The reason is that the effect on performance we measure is driven by at least two factors: 
managerial ability and her response to the shock (e.g., in terms of reduced effort supplied or 
fewer hours worked). To illustrate this problem, assume that performance, P, is given by the 
product of managerial ability, a, and effort supplied, e, as follows: 
 
P = a * e. 
 
The change in performance around a family members’ death is given by: 
 
∆P = a * es – a * en  
 
Or 
∆P == a ∆e, 
 
where en is the effort supplied under normal circumstances and es is the effort supplied following 
the shock. Under the assumption that the behavioral response to the shock is constant for 
everyone (constant ∆e), we could use the measured ∆P to rank managerial ability: the higher the 
magnitude of the performance change, the higher managerial ability. 
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However, if the behavioral response is not a constant across managers differences in ∆P 
across firm will capture variation in abilities and the response to the shock. Moreover, the 
interpretation of ∆P becomes problematic is ability and the behavioral response to the shock are 
correlated. For example, consider the extreme case in which high-ability individuals (high a) are 
also the ones who are not distracted from their professional activities even under extreme 
personal circumstances (∆e=0). In this case the magnitude of ∆P for high-ability managers would 
be zero and that for lower ability managers would be strictly positive. 
To investigate cross-sectional variation in ability and the behavioral response to the 
shock, we compare the effect of managers’ own shocks to that of shocks to managers’ family 
members as a function of individual, firm or industry characteristics. This strategy is valid if the 
firms affected by managers’ deaths are comparable to those affected by deaths of managers’ 
family members. 
As an illustration, suppose that we seek to evaluate the effect of managers’ education. We 
first compute the change in performance around managers’ own deaths separately for two groups 
of managers split by their education level. Suppose that we find that the change in performance is 
not affected by manager’s education. Because managers’ own deaths are not confounded with a 
behavioral response, one interpretation of this result is that managerial ability is not related to 
education level. We then compare the change in performance for the two groups of managers 
when the shock is defined as deaths of the managers’ family members. Suppose we find that 
performance drops more when relatives of highly educated managers suffer the family shocks. 
Because results from own shocks suggest that ability of these two groups if the same, a larger 
magnitude in the highly educated group would suggest that these managers have a larger 
behavioral response. 
Finally, to gain further understanding of the results, we study the cross-sectional 
distribution of the effect using individual, firm and industry characteristics. For example, a 
significant drop in performance around a managers’ death could be due to the fact that the 
deceased manager was particularly adept at managing the firm. If this were the case, we would 
expect a larger drop in performance in firms in which managerial ability is likely to be more 
important. The same negative drop could be alternatively explained by a lengthy succession 
process during which there is a power vacuum. If this were the case, we would expect to find a 
larger drop in performance in firms that had less time to prepare for the shock, that is, firms in 
which the death was sudden and unexpected. 
 
 14
IV. Results 
 
IV.A. Univariate analysis 
 
We initially test for the impact of top management own and relatives’ deaths on firm 
performance by computing mean differences in industry adjusted operating profitability around 
these events. These differences are computed using the average operating profitability in the year 
of the death and the year after, and subtracting the average profitability of the same firm the two 
years prior to the death.  
Table II shows that the 11,002 deaths in the sample are associated with an average 
decline in profitability of 0.63 percentage points. The decline is significant at the one-percent 
level. When we divide the deaths in the sample into two groups depending on whether they occur 
to CEOs or to board members, we find that it is only those deaths associated to the CEO directly 
or to his or her relatives that matter for firm profitability. Deaths occurring in the family or to the 
CEO are linked to a reduction in OROA of one percentage points, significant at the one-percent 
level. This decline in OROA is equivalent to 13 percent decline in profitability in two years. 
Board member shocks in contrast, do not exhibit a significant role on firm profitability. Average 
profitability falls by 0.25 percentage points, yet this decline in OROA is not statistically different 
from zero at conventional levels. The difference in the decline in performance between CEO and 
board member shocks is -0.747. It is, however, not statistically different from zero. 
The differential results for CEO and board members found in Table II could be 
graphically seen in Figure 1. Figure 1 plots average industry-adjusted OROA relative to the year 
prior to the deaths identified in the sample, which is set to zero. In contrast to Table II that only 
focuses on years t=-2, t=-1, t=0 and t=+1, Figure 1 reports average industry adjusted OROA for 
the years ranging from t=-4 to t=+4, where the data is available. Figure 1 shows there is no 
significant movement in firm profitability before the benchmark year. Yet after the shocks occur, 
firm profitability falls particularly for those firms that receive a CEO shock. Figure 1, also 
suggests the estimated effects would be larger than the first row in Table II suggests, if we were 
to open the window of analysis to include years t=+2 and t=+3. 
The second row in Table II presents mean declines in performance for the cases of direct-
manager deaths only. Consistent with the idea that senior management deaths harm firm 
profitability, we find that on average the 1,476 CEO and board members deaths identified in the 
sample are associated to a decline in profitability of 0.744 percentage points. Broken by 
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managerial roles, we find that CEO own deaths are correlated with a 1.44 percentage points 
decline in profitability, significant at the one-percent level. On the other hand, board members’ 
own deaths are associated to an insignificant 0.22 decline in OROA. The difference between CEO 
and board members deaths is 1.22 percentage points, significant at the 10-percent level. These 
mean differences suggest CEO shocks are arguably more important for firms’ prospects than 
shocks occurring to members of the board. 
Table II also presents mean differences in industry adjusted OROA for the case of 
spouse, children, parent and parent-in-law deaths. The effect of family deaths on firm profitability 
resembles the direct manager death effects. Namely, the point estimate of CEO shocks on 
performance is statistically different from zero for every event: spouses (one-percent level), 
children and parents (five-percent level), and parents-in-law (ten-percent level) deaths. The 
estimated coefficient ranges from -1.63 for children’ to -0.67 for parents-in-law. Interestingly, the 
largest average declines in profitability are found in the personal shocks that affect the CEOs own 
nuclear family, that is, in the deaths of their spouses and children. In contrast, no board member 
shock is, on average, statistically different from zero at conventional levels. The resulting CEO-
board member differences are generally no different from zero, yet they suggest CEO shocks tend 
to hurt firm performance more than shocks occurring to board members.  
One concern with the shocks identified above is that they might only be representative of 
small firms. Our dataset builds on the universe of firms in Denmark, where a significant fraction 
of firms is indeed small. To explore whether size alone could explain why we identify a 
relationship between managerial shocks and firm profitability, in Table III we divide the sample 
firms into five groups according to size (total assets). Given the results in Table II, in Table III we 
concentrate on the effect of CEO shocks only. For reference, we replicate in the first row of Table 
III the estimated coefficient for CEO events and we also report the estimated effects broken by 
direct and family events.  
Table III shows CEO shocks affect firms irrespective of which size quintile they belong 
to demonstrating a strong overlap between CEO’s personal and business spheres. The largest 
quintile of firms indicates that CEO shocks lead to a decline in OROA of 0.99 percentage points, 
significant at the one-percent level. The estimated effect of CEO shocks are -1.079, -1.218, -0.866 
and -0.853 for quintiles one through four. All of these shocks are significant at the five-percent 
level except for the shock on the smallest quintile, which is significant at the 10-percent level. 
Interestingly, the difference between quintile five and one is small (0.087) and not statistically 
different from zero. The last column in Table III tests for the difference between CEO death 
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effects and those derived from the death of family members for each size quintile. We fail to find 
significant differences for direct and indirect shocks.  
Table IV explores whether the direct and indirect shocks described above differ 
systematically as a function of the gender of the manager (Panel A) or the deceased (Panel B). As 
in Table III we only report shocks occurring to CEOs. Columns II and III report results for 
females and males, respectively. The first row in Table IV shows direct shocks only. We find 
that, on average, the 41 female-CEO deaths in the sample lead to a decline in operating 
profitability of 0.43 percentage points. Yet this decline is not significant at conventional levels. 
Male-CEO deaths (588 cases) are found to induce a decline in OROA of 1.51 percentage points, 
significant at the one-percent level. The difference across gender is not statistically different from 
zero. The fact that female CEOs are not found to induce a larger decline in firm profitability is 
not in line with the notion that those female CEOs that make it to the top managerial position are 
superior in terms of ability relative to those male CEOs that do not have to suffer discrimination.  
The second row in Table IV shows the average family shock effects for female and male 
CEOs. Firms whose female CEO suffers a death in the family undergo a decline in industry 
adjusted OROA by 2.23 percentage points, a decline of 28 percent relative to average 
profitability. In contrast, firms whose male-CEO suffers a family shock exhibit a decline in 
profitability by 0.80 percentage points (8 percent points). The difference for female and male 
family shocks is 1.43 lower for males, significant at the five-percent level.  
As discussed in Section III, the larger effect on female-CEO firms could be attributed to 
several firm or CEO characteristics, such as higher ability of female CEOs, differential 
emergency planning, or higher female commitment to family-related activities relative to males, 
among others. If, however, those firms that suffer direct and indirect shocks have comparable 
investment opportunities, organizational designs, family participation and CEO talent, the 
significant gap between female and male CEOs could potentially be attributed to a differential 
gender response to these family shocks. Alternatively, these differences could, for example, 
reflect the fact that female CEO shocks differ because a spouse shock also implies the loss of a 
key employee (the spouse). This “double” shock would be arguably less likely to occur in a male-
CEO firm if female-spouses are less likely to work in the same firms as male-spouses. 
When we analyze family shocks in detail, we find that female-CEO firms exhibit the 
largest effects on profitability in the case of spouses and children (-4.1 and 3.8 percentage points, 
significant at the one and ten percent levels, respectively), then parents (-2.4, significant at the 
five-percent level) and the lowest in the case of parents-in-law (an insignificant 0.428). The 
effects in male-CEO firms are less robust statistically: only those with over one thousand 
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observations are significant, that is, the shocks for parent and parents-in-law, both with estimated 
effects of close to 0.8 percentage points. 
In Panel B in Table IV, we test for differences in the estimated effects as a function of the 
gender of the deceased. We find large and statistically significant differences for spouses and 
parents-in-law. Specifically, the death of a male spouse is found to hurt firm performance by 3 
percentage points more relative to the female-spouse effect. Similarly, the death of a father-in-law 
is found to hurt firm profitability by 2.6 percentage points more than the death of a mother-in-
law. Surprisingly, mother-in-law deaths are the only family-shock event with a non-negative 
(although insignificant) estimated coefficient. 
One concern with the family-shock results in the preceding tables is that they might be 
explained by the death of a family member that is also employed in the same firm. Given that we 
could not identify who works for each specific firm, we can alternatively test if those family 
members that die but that are unlikely to work in the firm also induce significant performance 
shocks. In Table 5 Panel A, we investigate the impact of children deaths as a function of their 
age. Interestingly, industry-adjusted OROA in those firms whose CEO’s children die at an age 
younger than 18 years (65 observations) falls by 3.2 percentage points, significant at the one-
percent level. Conversely, the decline in OROA for older than 18 years of age children is one-
percentage points but it is not significantly different from zero. This result shows that it is 
unlikely that family shocks affect firm profitability because they hurt the labor force output of a 
family member that works in the same firm. 
Sorting by the number of children we find the biggest effects on firm profitability in 
cases where the CEO only has one child. Specifically, one-child death shocks correlate with a 5 
percentage point decline in firm profitability irrespective of the age of the child. The difference 
with respect to three or more children-CEO firms is -4.9, significant at the one-percent level. The 
lack of difference in the one-child cases for those younger than 18 and those 18 or older again 
cast doubt on the idea that family shocks are only driven by children who participate directly in 
the firms activities. 
In Table 5, Panel B, we provide an alternative test for the idea that family members hurt 
firm performance through their direct involvement in firms by investigating the differential effect 
of relative who die at an age of 75 years or older. Older relatives are presumably less likely to be 
directly involved in productive activities and if they are, it could be argued that the value of their 
productive output is potentially less valuable than the value of younger relatives. We find a 
significant decline in firm profitability of 0.90 in those firms whose CEO’s relatives die at age 75 
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or older, almost identical to the lower 0.92 found for younger relatives. The evidence does not 
support the idea that family shocks are larger for those relatives of active working age. 
Overall, univariate tests highlight four main results. First, CEO deaths affect firm 
profitability and show CEOs are material for firms’ prospects. Second, board member deaths do 
not seem to significantly affect firm performance. Third, the death of CEO family members 
including those who are not of active working age demonstrates a strong connection between the 
personal and business roles top CEOs play. Fourth, there is a differential family-shock effect in 
female- relative to male-CEO firms, which is not straightforward to disentangle. 
 
 
IV.B. Regression analysis 
 
Death associated shocks and firm profitability, asset and sales growth  
 
We now test for the impact of family and own deaths on firm performance controlling for 
an array of observable firm characteristics. In Table VI we test for the impact of these shocks on 
firm profitability, investment (asset growth) and sales growth using as controls firm size (natural 
logarithm of total assets), firm age, firm time-invariant characteristics (firm fixed effects) and 
aggregate time effects. As control group we initially use all non-event firms with available data. 
In all cases, we report clustered (firm) robust standard errors in order to adjust for the large 
number of firm-level observations and the potential problem arising from the fact that these 
observations might not be independent from each other (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainaithan 
(2004)). 
In Table VI Column I, we assess if these shocks affect firm operating profitability by 
comparing firm industry-adjusted OROA before and after the identified deaths using a two-year 
window. Notice that beyond the above-described controls, these specifications capture the effects 
net of average industry-year averages. We find that on average CEO and board shocks induce a 
decline in OROA of 0.32 percentage points, significant at the five percent level. The size and age 
controls suggest larger firms tend to be more profitable while older companies are likely to be 
less profitable than other firms. 
Column II in Table VI shows the impact of death shocks is economically large and 
statistically significant only for those firms where the shock affects the CEO. Board shocks do not 
significantly affect profitability levels. Further, the point estimate of the effect of board shocks on 
OROA is positive, yet indistinguishable statistically from zero. In contrast, CEO shocks reduce 
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firm operating profitability by 0.77 percentage points, significant at the one-percent level. 
Column III shows these effects are driven by CEO shocks.  
Table VI also shows the estimated effect of these shocks tends to fall as we expand the 
window of analysis to four years around events (Column IV) or when we estimate the difference 
in OROA using information from the years t=-4, t=-3 and t=+3, t=+4 for the event firms. Yet, 
event in this latter case, we find that own and family shocks to CEOs are found to harm 
performance by 0.63 and 0.54 percentage points, respectively. 
In Table VI Column VI we evaluate the impact of CEO-shocks on investment decisions 
measured by the change in total assets. CEO deaths could, for example, coincide with significant 
investments efforts by a new CEO which by construction would lead to a temporary reduction in 
operating profitability. We find that higher investments could not explain why OROA falls. On 
the contrary, asset growth falls significantly after these CEO shocks occur. The estimated 
coefficient indicates shock firms asset growth is 0.9 percentage points lower in the two year-
window around these events. This average decline is equivalent to a 20 percent decline in asset 
growth relative to mean investment levels. In other words, own and family shocks reduce 
operating profitability even when the firms affected by the shocks exhibit lower asset 
accumulation relative to their recent past and other firms in the economy. 
Lower profitability on assets and lower asset growth suggest a larger than proportional 
impact of family shocks on cash flow measures. To test this idea empirically, we evaluate the 
impact of CEO shocks on sales growth for those firms in the sample with available data around 
these events. Table VI, Column VII presents the findings. Sales growth is 2.2 percentage points 
lower for event-firms in the post period relative to other comparable firms. This decline is 
significant at the one-percent level. Sales growth declines do confirm that CEO shocks hurt cash 
flow measures more than OROA numbers suggest. 
 
Family and direct shocks, gender differences and younger relatives 
 
Table VII Columns I and II, replicates the analysis shown in the initial columns in Table 
VI using industry-adjusted OROA when we focus exclusively on events firms. We find that, on 
average, all CEO and board member shocks do not significantly affect OROA. The estimated 
effect is -0.2, but it is not different from zero at conventional levels. Interestingly, and consistent 
with previous analyses, Table VII Column II demonstrates CEO shocks induce large declines in 
profitability. The impact of CEO shocks on industry-adjusted OROA is -0.80, significant at the 
one-percent level. The impact of board shocks is again insignificant.  
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Table VII, Column III tests for differences in own and family shocks as a function of who 
these shocks occur to. We find that CEO shocks both direct and through the family significantly 
affect firm profitability. The average CEO-shock coefficient is -0.79, significant at the one-
percent. Conversely, the direct manager effect and the CEO-direct manager effects are no 
different from zero at conventional levels. These results indicate that the source of the shock 
seems less important than the channel, namely, the CEO. 
We now test for significant differences in manager effects as a function of the gender of 
the active manager. In Column IV of Table VII, we find shocks occurring to female-managers 
both CEO and board members are associated to a significantly larger shock to profitability by -
0.64, significant at the 10-percent level. Column V shows the female-manager effect is not 
significant when we split it into CEO-female firms and firms with a female board member.  
The last two columns in Table VII evaluate whether family members who are not linked 
to the firm are likely to generate a lower estimated effect on performance. Under the hypothesis 
that family shocks matter for firm performance only because they represent the death of a relative 
who directly contributes to firms’ outcomes, we would expect family deaths of relatives who are 
not expected to participate in the firm to generate a lower impact on firm profitability relative to 
those relatives who are of active working age. Alternatively, if family shocks affect firm 
performance because the CEO is less able to perform her or his responsibilities in the presence of 
a family shock due to a reduction in the effective time allocated to productive (non-family) tasks, 
we should find no difference. Column VI shows that shocks arising from the death of children 
younger than 18 years of age do not induce a significantly lower profitability relative to other 
shocks. Interestingly, when we interact the CEO with the young children shock terms (Column 
VII), we find that this term is linked, if anything, to higher –not lower– declines in OROA. As a 
result, Columns VI and VII suggest the CEO-family shock effects are indirect: they affect firm 
performance through the CEO. 
 
Unexpected shocks, top management structure and industry characteristics 
 
In Table VIII, Columns I and II we examine whether those deaths that are more likely to 
be classified as unexpected induce larger or smaller effects on firm profitability relative to other 
deaths. In Column I we only report those firms where the deceased was found to have died from a 
condition where the one-year probability of survival conditional on an initial diagnosis is less 
than 25 percent. As before, we find that board members-shocks do not significantly affect firm 
profitability in any sub-sample in Table VIII. 
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Looking at CEO shocks we find that those deaths that are more likely to be unexpected 
are associated to large declines in operating profitability of 2.1 percentage points, significant at 
the one-percent level. In contrast, the point estimate found in Column II, which corresponds to 
those conditions with larger than 25 percent one-year survival probabilities, is -0.7, also 
significant at the five-percent level. The fact that unexpected shocks are more harmful to firm 
performance could be attributed to the fact that expected deaths allow both family and firms to 
prepare both emotionally and in organizational terms for the eventual shock. In the case of the 
direct CEO shocks, firms have more time to prepare for an orderly management transition. 
Similarly, expected family shocks are less likely to reduce the effective productive abilities of 
CEOs by providing time to plan both at the firm and at home for the eventual family shock. 
Columns III and IV in Table VIII seek to directly test for the differential impact of CEO 
shocks under alternative organizational structures. In particular, Denmark provides with an 
interesting laboratory for analysis as the legal environment allows a range of small firms to use a 
dual CEO structure in lieu of a board of directors. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
evaluate whether such organizational structure is superior relative to other forms of organization, 
it is arguably reasonable to assume that dual CEO structures are better prepared to overcome a 
direct-CEO or a CEO-family shock relative to unique-CEO hierarchies. In Column III we report 
the estimated coefficients for the sub-sample of firms with a single-CEO arrangement. We find a 
gap in industry adjusted OROA of -0.96, significant at the one-percent level. Interestingly, 
Column IV shows that the sub-sample of dual-CEO firms do not undergo statistically significant 
declines in operating profitability after they are subject to a CEO shock. The estimated CEO-
shock effect is -0.47 but it is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels. These 
results do suggest that organizational planning and structures could potentially reduce the impact 
of CEO shocks on firm performance. 
Table VIII also shows the results when we split the firms in the sample into two groups 
based on the growth patterns of the industries in which the relevant firms operate in. We split the 
industries in half based on total asset growth at the industry level during the sample period. 
Column V (VI) shows the results for those firms in industries with relatively slow (high) asset 
growth. We find that CEO-shocks are found to reduce operating OROA in the two sub-samples, 
leading to a decline in operating profitability of 0.67 and 0.91 percentage points in the slower and 
faster growth industries, respectively.   
Finally in Table VIII we test for evidence that chief executive officers tend to be more 
important in relatively high skilled industries. Bennedsen, et al (2007) show the value of 
professional CEOs tends to be higher in those industries where a large fraction of the labor force 
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is relatively well educated. Columns VII and VII present the results when we divide the firms in 
the sample into two groups based on the industry-level share of employees with a college or 
superior degree. Consistent with the idea that the firm effects derived from CEO-shocks are 
linked to CEO ability, we show that CEO shocks only hurt firm profitability in knowledge 
intensive industries. In contrast, CEO shocks are not statistically different from zero in industries 
with low labor force schooling levels. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have investigated the impact of individual shocks occurring to senior 
management or to the relatives of senior management on firm performance. We have argued that 
analyzing these shocks is attractive because they provide a plausible exogenous source of 
variation to (1) empirically assess the importance of managers on their firms’ performance, and 
(2) to quantify the interaction between the personal and business roles that managers play.  
To pursue these tests, we used a unique dataset that allowed us to match every firm in 
Denmark to information about its financials and management teams, as well as to official Civil 
Registry data on its managers. Based on these data we were able to construct manager specific 
family trees and to identify cases of managers’ own and immediate relatives’ deaths. 
We first used senior management deaths to evaluate whether firm profitability is affected 
when chief executive officers (CEOs) and board members die. We found that firms’ prospects 
were significantly negatively affected by the loss of their CEOs, but were unaffected by the death 
of a member of the board. Our results, as a result, provide empirical support to the idea that 
certain managers, in our sample firms CEOs, are extremely important firms’ performance: CEO 
deaths affect firms operating profitability, its investment decisions and sales growth. 
After documenting the direct effect of CEOs on firm performance we also investigated 
the importance of family shocks on firms’ outcomes. We argued empirically the deaths of the 
CEOs immediate family members have a causal impact on firm performance. In contrast to own 
CEO death events, these alternative shocks affect firms’ prospects indirectly through the CEO. 
CEO’s immediate family deaths and their tragic consequences seem to reduce the CEOs 
effectiveness in the business front, leading to significant declines in profitability. We showed 
these personal and business connections are prevalent in both small and large firms and that the 
results are not explained by deceased family members who engaged in productive activities 
relevant to the CEO’s firm.  
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Overall, our paper provides startling evidence that chief executive officers are able to 
significantly affect firm performance. CEO death analysis shows firms with current chief 
executives outperform relative to firms’ outcomes without them. Similarly, the study of 
immediate family-deaths demonstrate that, on average, those firms whose CEO is under personal 
stress are likely to underperform their peers.  
Whether these CEO effects are the result of the efficiency value of CEOs, or are 
alternatively the result of pre-shock strategic behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) that made 
chief executives indispensable ex-post, is a topic for further research.  
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Figure 1. Industry-adjusted operating profitability: 
all managers and family deaths
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Industry-adjusted at t=-1 is used as a benchmark
Deaths are classified as CEO (board member) deaths whenever they occur to the relevant manager or to 
his/her spouse, children, parents or parents-in-law
Source: authors’ calculations
 27
TABLE I. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Variable All
(IV)
Ln assets 8.130 8.045 8.621 0.576 ***
(0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0148) (0.0158)
[74,880] [63,878] [11,002]
Operating return on assets 0.060 0.057 0.077 0.020 ***
(OROA) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0009)
[74,880] [63,878] [11,002]
Net income to assets 0.034 0.032 0.041 0.009 ***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0009)
[74,880] [63,878] [11,002]
Industry adjusted OROA 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0098 0.011 ***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0010)
[74,880] [63,878] [11,002]
Ln sales 8.144 7.996 8.861 0.865 ***
(0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0279) (0.0300)
[33,907] [28,121] [5,796]
Firm Age 11.187 10.197 16.936 6.739 ***
(0.1237) (0.1403) (0.2062) (0.2602)
[74,880] [63,878] [11,002]
Asset growth 0.039 0.037 0.045 0.008 ***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0014)
[62,371] [51,386] [10,985]
Sales growth 0.034 0.032 0.041 0.009 ***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0009)
[24,767] [19,831] [4,936]
Difference
(I) (III)
Non-Event Firms Event Firms
(II)
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The number of firms are in squared brackets. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE II. TOP MANAGEMENT SHOCKS AND FIRM PROFITABILITY 
 
Type of Death All
(IV)
All -0.634 *** -1.001 *** -0.254 -0.747
(0.125) (0.182) (0.170) (0.0510)
[11,002] [5,597] [5,405]
Manager -0.744 ** -1.444 *** -0.224 -1.220 *
(0.309) (0.530) (0.367) (0.645)
[1,476] [629] [847]
Spouse -0.872 *** -1.344 *** -0.407 -0.937
(0.322) (0.483) (0.425) (0.644)
[1,483] [736] [747]
Children -0.710 -1.626 ** 0.464 -2.090 *
(0.581) (0.761) (0.893) (1.173)
[415] [233] [182]
Parents -0.626 *** -0.911 *** -0.302 -0.609
(0.188) (0.265) (0.265) (0.375)
[5,067] [2,691] [2,376]
Parents-in-law -0.438 -0.671 * -0.194 -0.477
(0.270) (0.390) (0.374) (0.540)
[2,561] [1,308] [1,253]
(I) (II) (III)
Type of Manager
Chief Executive Board member Difference
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The number of firms are in squared brackets. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE III. CEO SHOCKS AND FIRM PROFITABILITY: SIZE QUINTILES 
 
Size quintile All
(IV)
All -1.001 *** -1.444 *** -0.945 -0.499
(0.181) (0.530) (0.194) (0.0564)
[5,597] [629] [4,968]
Smallest quintile -1.079 * -2.609 -0.883 -1.726
(0.567) (1.699) (0.601) (1.180)
[1,121] [127] [994]
Quintile 2 -1.218 *** -0.472 -1.290 *** 0.818
(0.426) (1.158) (0.442) (1.163)
[1,119] [98] [1,021]
Quintile 3 -0.866 ** -2.283 * -0.705 * -1.578
(0.364) (1.186) (0.382) (1.124)
[1,119] [114] [1,005]
Quintile 4 -0.853 ** -0.492 -0.901 ** 0.409
(0.334) (0.796) (0.363) (0.873)
[1,119] [132] [987]
Largest quintile -0.992 *** -1.300 * -0.941 *** -0.359
(0.286) (0.684) (0.314) (0.751)
[1,119] [158] [961]
Difference (largest) vs. 0.087 1.309 -0.058 1.367
(smallest) (0.635) (1.830) (0.678) (1.948)
(I) (II) (III)
Type of Death
Chief Executive Family Member Difference
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The number of firms are in squared brackets. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE IV. CEO SHOCKS AND FIRM PROFITABILITY: BY GENDER 
 
All
(IV)
Manager -1.444 *** -0.458 -1.513 *** 1.055
(0.530) (1.771) (0.554) (1.184)
[629] [41] [588]
Family members -0.945 *** -2.226 *** -0.796 *** -1.430 **
(0.194) (0.652) (0.202) (0.682)
[4,968] [518] [4,450]
Spouse -1.344 *** -4.120 *** -0.698 -3.422 ***
(0.483) (1.072) (0.538) (1.198)
[736] [139] [597]
Children -1.626 ** -3.763 * -1.458 -2.305
(0.761) (1.845) (0.808) (1.972)
[233] [17] [216]
Parents -0.911 *** -2.417 ** -0.766 *** -1.651
(0.265) (1.000) (0.273) (1.039)
[2,691] [236] [2,455]
Parents-in-law -0.671 * 0.428 -0.788 ** 1.216
(0.390) (1.146) (0.402) (1.509)
[1,308] [126] [1,182]
Spouse -0.765 -3.788 *** 3.023 **
(0.537) (1.093) (1.216)
[595] [141]
Children -2.271 -1.275 -0.996
(1.536) (0.830) (1.744)
[82] [151]
Parents -0.941 ** -0.891 ** -0.050
(0.377) (0.364) (0.524)
[1,090] [1,601]
Parents-in-law 0.889 -1.668 *** 2.557 ***
(0.689) (0.459) (0.828)
[510] [1,601]
DifferenceFemale Male
Panel B. Gender of Deceased
Type of Death
Panel A. Gender of CEO
(I) (II) (III)
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The number of firms are in squared brackets. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE V. CEO SHOCKS AND FIRM PROFITABILITY: BY AGE AND 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
 
Panel A. Children deaths only
All
(IV)
All children -1.626 ** -3.247 *** -0.999 -2.248
(0.761) (1.386) (0.907) (1.653)
[233] [65] [168]
Number of Children:
One -5.179 *** -5.234 ** -5.148 ** -0.086
(1.142) (2.316) (1.847) (2.948)
[30] [11] [19]
Two -1.993 -3.756 * -1.303 -2.453
(1.387) (2.046) (1.757) (2.688)
[96] [27] [69]
Three or more -0.300 -1.928 0.250 -2.178
(1.000) (2.495) (1.050) (2.687)
[107] [27] [80]
Difference (three or more) 4.879 *** 3.306 5.398 ** -2.092
vs. (one child) (1.731) (3.388) (2.100) (3.956)
Panel B. All relatives excluding children
All
All non-child relatives -0.912 *** -0.922 *** -0.895 *** -0.027
(0.200) (0.252) (0.327) (0.413)
[4,735] [2,981] [1,754]
Age of Relative
< 75 years 75 or older Difference
Age of Child
< 18 years 18 or older Difference
(I) (II) (III)
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The number of firms are in squared brackets. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE VI. CEO SHOCKS AND FIRM PROFITABILITY: REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
Shocks -0.3168 ** 0.0692
(0.1345) (0.1779)
CEO shocks -0.7664 *** -0.6937 *** -0.6313 *** -0.5444 ** -0.899 *** -2.224 ***
(0.2633) (0.1974) (0.1826) (0.2631) (0.3707) (0.7642)
Ln assets 2.6501 *** 2.6502 *** 2.6524 *** 2.6496 *** 2.6211 *** 19.194 *** 10.7840 ***
(0.0802) (0.0802) (0.0812) (0.0792) (0.0804) (0.2488) (0.4248)
Firm age -0.3027 *** -0.3026 *** -0.3035 *** -0.3024 *** -0.2997 *** -0.9852 *** -1.1144 ***
(0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0280) (0.0550)
Year controls
Firm fixed-effects
Window for event firms
Type of shocks
Number of shocks
Number of firms
Firm fixed-effects
Number of observations
Adjusted-R 2 
Yes
399,097
0.2989
(IV)
Yes
Yes
CEOs only
5,597
69,475
Yes
CEOs only
5,597
[t=-2,t=+2]
Industry-Adjusted OROA
[t=-2,t=+2][t=-2,t=+2]
11,002 11,002
Yes Yes
Asset growth Sales growth
(III)
Yes
21,75469,475
YesYes YesYes
412,514
0.2970
[t=-4,-3] and 
[t=+3,t=+4]
[t=-4,t=+4]
396,438
0.2961
69,242
5,364
93,951
0.1293
[t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2]
56,970
313,864
0.1848
2,4945,585
CEOs only
423,322
0.3032
74,880
423,322
0.3032
74,880
(VII)(I) (II) (V) (VI)
Dependent Variables: 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEOs onlyAll All CEOs only
YesYes Yes Yes Yes
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE VII. MANAGER AND SHOCK CHARACTERISTICS 
 
(III) (IV) (V)
Shocks -0.1991 0.2091 0.1818 0.3549 0.2862 0.1810 0.1625
(0.2168) (0.2483) (0.2626) (0.2636) (0.3098) (0.2850) (0.2874)
CEO shocks -0.7998 *** -0.7948 *** -0.8822 *** -0.7919 *** -0.7947 *** -0.7560 ***
(0.2615) (0.2850) (0.2678) (0.3098) (0.2850) (0.2874)
Manager direct shocks 0.1704 0.1742 0.1413 0.1712 0.1920
(0.4299) (0.4299) (0.4314) (0.4303) (0.4307)
CEO * Manager direct shocks 0.0305 0.0305 0.0194 0.0304 -0.0084
(0.7289) (0.7289) (0.7296) (0.7289) (0.7298)
Female manager -0.6437 * -0.4386
(0.3603) (0.4133)
CEO * Female manager -0.6008
(0.8044)
Shocks children < 18 deaths 0.0530 1.5214
(1.0773) (1.5315)
CEO Shocks * Children < 18 deaths -2.9842
(2.1362)
Year controls
Firm fixed-effects
Window for event firms
Type of shocks
Number of shocks
Number of firms
Firm fixed-effects
Number of observations
Adjusted-R 2 
[t=-2,t=+2][t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2]
49,012
0.3715 0.3717 0.3717 0.3717 0.3717 0.3717
49,012 49,012 49,012 49,01249,012
11,00211,00211,002
Yes
49,012
11,002
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
11,002 11,002 11,002
All
11,002 11,002 11,002 11,002 11,002 11,002
All All
YesYesYes
All
[t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2]
Yes
All AllAll
(I)
YesYes Yes
Dependent Variable: Industry-Adjusted OROA
(VI) (VII)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYes
0.3717
(II)
11,002
 
 
All regressions include controls for the natural logarithm of assets, and firm age. Results not shown.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE VIII. FIRM AND INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
CEO shocks -2.0701 ** -0.6930 ** -0.9635 *** -0.4732 -0.6692 * -0.9115 ** -0.9848 ** -0.5440
(0.8158) (0.3001) (0.2750) (0.5797) (0.3608) (0.3773) (0.4438) (0.4087)
Shocks 0.5294 0.2820 0.3627 -0.2500 0.0524 0.3583 0.4111 0.2536
(0.7141) (0.2833) (0.2750) (0.5793) (0.3322) (0.3672) (0.4041) (0.3938)
Firm fixed-effects
Window for event firms
Type of shocks
Number of shocks/shocks
Firm fixed-effects
Number of observations
(VII)
Yes
18,561
Dependent Variable: Industry-Adjusted OROA
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VIII)
Yes Yes Yes
5,379 35,816 37,785 11,227 24,729 24,139 18,009
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
[t=-2,t=+2]
All
4,102
All All All
1,156 7,674 8,505 2,497 5,506 5,460 4,042
All All All All
Yes Yes Yes
[t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2]
Yes Yes Yes Yes
One year 
prob of 
survival<0.25
One year prob 
of survival ≥ 
0.25
One CEO 
Structure
Low Labor Force 
Schooling Levels
Dual CEO 
Structure
Slow Industry 
Growth
Fast Industry 
Growth
High Labor 
Force Schooling 
Levels
 
 
All regressions include controls for the natural logarithm of assets, and firm age. Results not shown.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
